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I. Introduction 
This paper considers how the poorest countries, measured in GDP per capita, can 
improve their living standards through industrialization. GDP per capita is closely though 
not perfectly correlated with the HDI and the use of either standard shows a very large 
percentage of the worst-off countries are in sub-saharan Africa (SSA). Moreover, of the 
lowest ranking countries, they are among the few that have experienced significant 
declines in per capita GDP and other indices over the last quarter century and have 
experienced few sustained periods of improvement.  
The most fundamental need in SSA and other very low income countries is to 
revitalize the agricultural sector. Abundant evidence suggests that the sector has been 
harmed by policy measures that severely discriminate against it. Farmers receive lower 
prices than warranted by world prices, pay higher prices for productive inputs due to 
tariffs on imports, have little access to rural credit, suffer from an absence of research that 
is specific to their agro-climate requirements, and rarely benefit from agricultural 
extension services. All of these deficiencies are amenable to improvements in 
government policy. The first step in improving living standards is to rectify the intensity 
of discrimination against the agricultural sector. Perhaps new development in technology 
services such as the various World Bank web sites can aid governments in learning about 
appropriate policies or improve the training of agricultural extension agents. But the 
required changes in policies have been understood for a long time – the difficulty in 
implementation is a political rather than a technical one.  
In contrast, the requirements for successful industrial development are less well 
understood yet great hopes have been placed on new information technologies as a 
potential benefactor of the industrial sector in poor countries. Some of the optimism has 
been generated by the performance of the Indian software sector in recent years. But the 
software sector is very different than manufacturing. Moreover, it holds few hopes in the 
near term for a country like Tanzania in which secondary school enrollment is still very 
low and university education is received by less than 1% of the population. Even in India, 
the software sector will have few benefits for the hundreds of millions of people who rely 
on bullocks as their main source of capital and subsist on less than $1 per day. Later in   2
this paper, I will discuss the implications of the newest technologies, particularly the 
internet, for production in the poorest nations.  Like many other previous magic bullets, it 
seems unlikely that the internet will offer a panacea for the difficult problems that 
currently characterize African manufacturing. Similarly optimistic predictions about the 
role of main frame computers and then of PCs were voiced in previous decades with no 
visible results. I will concentrate on the industrial sector as this is the sector that is not 
limited by soil quality and climate. Nevertheless, it is conspicuously weak.  
II The Background in Africa 
In 1975 the relative per capita income of many of the poorest countries was a 
much higher percentage than it was twenty years later. The income per capita of sub-
saharan African countries in the years 1975 and 1995 relative to that in a number of 
Asian countries is shown in Table 1. The relative declines were enormous. In the case of 
Indonesia and Thailand, SSA on the average had greater per capita income in 1975, an 
advantage that was reversed by 1995, the ratio for Indonesia going from 1.83 to .50, that 
for Thailand from 1.08 to .18. While the Asian nations were not by rich by DC standards 
in 1975, Korea and Taiwan had experienced a decade of significant growth and many of 
their human development indicators, including life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
education were already quite good. They had begun a demographic transition and had 
undergone significant economic transformation from countries with a substantial 
percentage of GDP and employment in agriculture and small scale informal sector 
enterprises to a higher value added per worker industrial structure.  
Some of the Asian countries such as Korea and Taiwan had dramatically closed 
the relative gap between themselves and the OECD countries by 1975 yet all of their 
success had been achieved without the benefits of the then newest technologies. Certainly 
the accessibility and the use of the internet were not issues nor did these Asian countries 
“leapfrog” from relative backwardness to high technology. Rather than vault into the 
newest technologies, they moved slowly up the ladder of economic  complexity. 
The issue facing the poorest LDCs is to replicate, in the early decades of the 21
st 
century, the four decade old achievements, of previous success stories. Despite all of the 
discussion of convergence among countries, divergence has been the rule in the last   3
decades for most countries.
1  
If by 2010 the poorest countries could achieve the absolute human development 
indicators of 1975 of Korea or other countries shown in Table 2, it would constitute an 
extraordinary achievement and greatly enhance the welfare of their populations. While 
declining relative income per capita and growing absolute gaps across countries are 
understandably of concern, the critical issues for the poor are the number of calories and 
micronutrients consumed per day, the acquisition of a third shirt, the ability to purchase a 
bar of soap or a toothbrush. Increases in absolute income in say Kenya enables such 
purchases regardless of whether Kenya is falling further behind the U.S. in relative per 
capita income. While some would argue that Kenyan farmers may be made unhappy by 
the increasing purchases of home theatre systems in western Europe, it is unlikely that for 
most residents of very poor countries relative income disparities across nations are nearly 
as important as their own absolute levels of consumption.  
What is required to bring improve the lot of the mass of population in the poorest 
nations? Among the requisites are the following fundamentals: 
 
1.  increased rates of saving and investment; 
2.  improvement in education, especially primary and secondary, including that 
for girls; 
3.  a stable macroeconomic framework that limits inflation and government 
deficits, the latter being conducive to inflation which reduces the ability of the 
private sector farms and firms to perform effectively. Roughly balanced 
budgets prevent the public sector from absorbing the limited saving of the 
private sector; 
4.  the maintenance of a relatively stable real exchange rate 
5.  openness to international trade of goods and services as well as ideas, the 
latter taking the form of international technology flows such as technology 
                                                 
1 See Pritchett,    4
licenses; 
6.  the provision of adequate infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications, 
and electricity, an absence of any of these greatly hindering sustained 
economic development; 
7.  a legal system that enforces contracts; 
8.  limits on corruption. 
Absent the presence of most of these “fundamentals,” the poorest countries will 
not perform well. While many cross country regressions attempt to parse the relative 
contribution of each of these factors to growth in per capita income, the  results about the 
individual contributions are highly variable, depending on the periods chosen and the 
variables used. There are only a few robust results (Levine and Renelt, 1992) and the 
identification of the contribution of individual factors cannot be solved by forming panel 
data sets (Pritchett, 2000).  
In the case of the poorest countries, it seems unlikely that sustained growth can be 
achieved without considerable progress on the fundamentals. Assuming for the rest of the 
discussion in this paper that many of the fundamental conditions are achieved, what are 
the dimensions of the development problem, particularly in Africa, and how can these be 
addressed? 
III.  Some Stylized Facts About African Manufacturing 
As shown in Figure 1, most SSA countries have low ratios of manufacturing value 
added, VAM, to GDP. In 1990, the last year for which relatively complete data are 
available, eighteen countries exhibited VAM/GDP ratios below .10 and only ten countries 
had higher ratios. It is likely that countries not reporting data would be largely in the 
lowest group with ratios below .05. Overtime most nations have a constant or falling 
share. Part of the stagnation or decline in relative manufacturing output in SSA can be 
attributed to Engel effects. As real per capita income declined after 1975, the demand for 
manufactured goods often fell by a still higher percentage, reflecting its higher income 
elasticity than that for agricultural products.  
Domestic income elasticities of demand do not, however, completely determine   5
the sectoral structure of production if the economy exploits opportunities in the 
international market. The tight link between domestic production and consumption in the 
economies of SSA has, however, generally not been broken, manufacturing exports 
constituting a tiny percentage of manufacturing output. The data suggest that the 
economic structure is largely determined by low domestic per capita income and the 
resulting limited effective demand for manufactured goods. 
3.A   Relationships Among Sectors Within Countries 
Employment in manufacturing as a share of total employment is smaller than that 
for value added, implying that the value added/employment ratio, VA/N, is greater than 
that for the entire economy. The VA/N ratio relative to that for all sectors for a number of 
countries  is shown in Figure 2. In 1990 the  ratio was above 2 in fourteen countries and 
below 1 in only five.
2 This may result from greater capital intensity and/or higher total 
factor productivity at domestic prices. If it is former, the greater value of VA/N in 
manufacturing does not necessarily have any efficiency implications. Capital intensity 
may be higher due to differences in sectoral production functions or to upward distortions 
in the wage-rental ratio relative to other sectors.  
If greater VA/N is due to higher TFP at efficiency prices, the manufacturing 
sector may offer an opportunity for improving income per capita. However, TFP levels in 
manufacturing, measured at domestic prices, may be exaggerated if value added is 
increased above scarcity prices as government intervention turns the terms of trade 
against other sectors. For example, high rates of effective protection, before recent 
reforms, raised manufacturing income while reducing the value added (at domestic 
prices) in sectors that purchase intermediate manufactured goods at prices in excess of 
world prices. If sectoral value added were revalued at world prices, the share of the 
manufacturing sector in GDP would be significantly below the low levels that prevail.  
These considerations imply that, despite its small size, the manufacturing sector in 
most countries in SSA may be too large relative to a sectoral structure that would 
                                                 
2 The source of these data, African Development Indicators, does not contain more recent 
uniform data across countries.   6
maximize current national income at world prices. This static loss could be justified if  
the cost of learning sets the stage for the eventual growth of an efficient sector. So far 
such learning has not occurred, at least as measured by changes in labor productivity in 
most countries over the past quarter century. Despite its current dismal performance, 
many analysts believe that manufacturing provides one of the major economic 
opportunities in SSA, particularly in light of the low quality soil and a climate hostile to 
high agricultural productivity (Bloom and Sachs, 1998).  
 
3.B   African Manufacturing in an International Context 
 
It is useful to obtain some sense of the current performance of the manufacturing 
sector in a variety of African economies. In particular, it will be shown that even in 
traditional industrial products, the capital-labor ratio in many countries is surprisingly 
high  relative to that in the industrialized countries. Moreover, total factor productivity in 
is quite low relative to that in the industrialized countries. These differences have two 
implications: (1) the present mastery of traditional technology is very low and that high 
technology fixes are not likely to be appropriate given the failure to absorb technologies 
that are more than a century old; (2) an appropriate choice of technology, to be defined 
below, could generate considerable increases in income to be realized from a given 
investment.  
Data collected from African firms by the Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development of  the World Bank (Biggs et. al., 1995) provide, on a consistent basis,  
information from hundreds of firms on value added, capital stock, and labor for a number 
of SSA countries in the early 1990s. The average relative labor productivity (calculated 
as the mean of sectoral values) compared to the U.S. is shown in Table 3 for Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe for two years during which the surveys 
were carried out, 1992 and 1994. Also shown are the capital-labor ratio relative to the 
U.S. and total factor productivity relative to the U.S. averages for four sectors based upon 
firm levels surveys of Biggs et. al. (1995).    7
Labor productivity in comparable sectors is exceptionally low, except in 
Cameroon. Moreover, even these low figures are overestimates of true relative 
productivity as value added in the African countries includes a large rent component as a 
result of higher levels of effective protection. Relative capital-labor ratios are 
considerably greater implying the very low total factor productivity shown in the last 
panel of the table. The capital-labor ratios shown are sector wide averages across firms of 
all sizes – they are much greater for larger firms and the TFP of such firms is even lower 
than those shown in the table. 
The industries for which the calculations have been done, food processing, 
textiles and clothing, wood furniture, and metal products are technically simple and have 
been in existence in industrialized countries for well over a century. In these and other 
sectors there is little that the “new economy” can do to help improve the woefully low 
productivity levels. Improved incentives, including further reductions in tariff levels, 
could provide the incentive to seek productivity enhancement. The necessary transfer of 
technology can be achieved by hiring technically trained employees on a long term basis 
and by suitably designed incentive contracts. In none of the sectors is proprietary 
technology significant thus making moot even the need for technology licensing. Given 
the magnitude of the shortfall from American TFP levels, a combination of policy reform 
and technological improvement could increase output from existing resources by 10 or 15 
in most of the industries in most of the countries. Even if the firms in these nations 
achieved 50 percent of U.S. total factor productivity, huge increases in value added from 
existing resources would be possible, implying a large rise in living standards.  
Another potential gain would arise if more labor intensive technologies were 
chosen when new investment decisions were made. Given the relatively high capital-
labor ratios shown in Table 3 and the much greater ones for large firms in each country, 
the  increases in value added from appropriate technology choice of technology may be 
very large though smaller than that from low levels of TFP. Before considering the 
options for improving TFP, I first consider the benefits from the choice of more 
appropriate technology.   8
IV Choice of Technique  
If manufacturing is to yield widespread benefits for many citizens rather than 
confer privilege on a small group lucky enough to obtain jobs in the formal 
manufacturing sector, its development needs to maximize the income and employment 
generated by a given investment in the sector. As will be seen below, higher real income 
and employment will occur simultaneously if firms pursue the correct choice of 
technology, one that minimizes the cost of production given scarcity prices for capital 
and labor. Nevertheless, many firms in SSA and other low income LDCs choose capital-
intensive techniques of production even when labor intensive choices exist. Such 
decisions result in a loss of GDP for a given investment level and generate fewer modern 
sector jobs than would be generated by a more appropriate choice of technology. Given 
the per capita income characterizing most SSA countries and their sectoral production 
profiles, appropriate choice of technology is an important source of potential income 
gains, even apart from the growth in total factor productivity (TFP). 
Much of the potential use of labor rather than equipment in a plant stems from use 
of labor-intensive methods in "peripheral" production activities; labor, with little if any 
capital, can be used to transport material efficiently within the factory, to pack cartons, 
and to store the final product. The basis for these statements is observation of factory 
operations in industrial countries and LDCs. Evidence also exists that the core production 
process itself, whether cooking of food or production of yarn, offers efficient possibilities 
for using less expensive equipment and more labor per unit of output. Adaptations in the 
use of existing equipment, for example, increasing the normal speed of operation, offers 
additional opportunities to save capital and increase the relative use of labor. 
The extent to which labor can be substituted for capital varies across industrial 
sectors, being greater in sugar processing and textile manufacturing than in fertilizer 
production. Whatever the appeal to national pride, steel, fertilizer, and other products 
whose production can be carried out only with very large amounts of capital per worker 
are inappropriate products for local manufacturing in most poor countries. The basic 
problem is to forestall the establishment of intrinsically capital intensive sectors, any 
choice of technology that does exist in these being of minor importance. Indeed, a good   9
part of the initial success of the fast growing Asian countries was their generally correct 
sectoral emphasis as well as the selection within sectors of appropriate technology.
3 The 
fact that some of these countries, for example, Korea, eventually upgraded their industrial 
structure to steel, autos, non-electrical machinery, and semi-conductor chips, does not 
vitiate the general principle; this occurred only after the success of the labor- intensive 
strategy and in response to one result of this success, namely, the growth in real wages.  
IV.A. Benefits of appropriate technological choice 
 
The following presents briefly some estimates of the benefits to be obtained by a 
typical poor country from carefully choosing appropriate technology rather than more 
advanced technology. The benefits include increased income produced by the industrial 
sector, greater wages and profits, and greater employment. To establish some orders of 
magnitude it is necessary to specify both the goods to be manufactured and the alternative 
methods available for their production. The products and two values of investment per 
worker with which each can be manufactured are shown in Table 4.
4 These good are 
currently manufactured in many LDCs and, for better or worse, are high on the priority 
list when an expansion of industrial production is considered. 
The products include some about which it is generally assumed that choice in 
production method is physically feasible - shoes, yarn, and woven cloth - as well as those 
in which the intrinsic nature of the production process, for example, dealing with heavy 
materiel processed at very high temperatures  suggests that not much variation is possible 
–fertilizers and beer. The figures in the advanced technology column indicate the amount 
of investment per worker that would be required if an LDC plant were to be established 
with the same core machinery and material transfer mechanisms as are used in a 
developed country. The second column shows the amount of investment when an 
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development see Westphal and Rhee, 1977. 
4 Although the specific values were determined in the early 1980s, given the nature of the 
production processes it is likely that roughly similar alternatives currently exist, the major 
difference being that equipment is more costly.    10
appropriate technology is purchased. Appropriate, here, is defined as the combination of 
labor and equipment that maximizes the profitability to the firm at scarcity prices, 
whether private or state owned, and it can be shown that this is consistent with 
maximizing GDP.
5 
The appropriate technology shown is not necessarily the most labor-intensive 
production method available. Those that require even smaller investment per worker but 
are less profitable are not considered. With the exception of fertilizer and beer, the 
difference between advanced and appropriate technology is very large, well over 100%. 
Equally impressive is the variation in capital-intensity among products even when the 
choice is restricted only to appropriate technologies. The potential impact of selecting the 
right product as well as the correct process is clear. 
Envision a country planning to establish new production capacity in each of the 
listed products, and for simplicity assume that $100 million is to be invested in one year 
in each of the sectors including some “wrong” sectors. What is the effect on national 
income, total wages, total profits, and employment of systematically choosing the 
appropriate rather than the advanced technology? Rather than present the results sector 
by sector, Table 5 presents a summary of the impact for the nine products as a group. The 
level of national income produced by the large-scale manufacturing sector can be 
increased by 71 percent, total wage payments by 311 percent, total profits by 51 percent, 
and employment by 311 percent. The significance of these figures can be stated in a 
number of ways. For example, for employment to be increased commensurately if 
advanced technology were chosen would require investment to be 300 percent greater.  
From another perspective, the effect of the proper choice of production method on 
national income produced by manufacturing is equivalent to 10 years of industrial growth 
at a rate of 6.5 percent per annum. 
                                                 
5  The discussion in this section is drawn from my article, "Macroeconomic 
Implications, of Factor Substitution in Industrial Processes," Journal of Development 
Economics, 1982. 
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The impact of technology choice on disparities among individuals and households 
within a country can be inferred from the last three columns of Table 5. Employment in 
modern sector manufacturing plants is much greater when appropriate rather than capital- 
intensive plants are adopted. Thus a smaller percentage of the labor force is forced into 
marginal occupations, such as street vending or low income workshop activity.  
 
IV.B. Some obstacles to correct decisions 
Just as where one stands on a political issue often depends on the side of the 
legislative aisle on which one sits, the relative importance of the various obstacles to 
pursuing an appropriate industrialization policy, as seen by analysts of the problem, 
depends on more general perceptions about the process of economic development. 
Though almost all analysts note the same set of obstacles, the emphasis on one or another 
is often derived from attitudes toward public versus private ownership, the correct role 
for multinational as compared with domestic ownership, and the role of markets for both 
products and factors of production. 
 
IV.B.1. Type of ownership 
 
Some scholars have argued that private owners of firms are anxious to avoid 
dealing with large numbers of workers. While this piece of casual empiricism is 
undoubtedly partly correct, it does not follow that public enterprises choose more 
appropriate technology. The limited amount of systematic evidence on this question 
suggests that both types of firms choose quite similar equipment in countries where both 
operate in the same sector, for example, Turkey. In countries such as Tanzania, with few 
private firms, such comparisons are not possible; however, in these countries public 
sector firms appear to have chosen similar machinery to that employed in neighboring 
countries by privately owned companies.
6 A different binary classification is often 
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thought to be of decisive importance, namely, the difference between foreign and 
domestically owned firms, regardless of whether the latter are public or private. The 
entirely a priori argument suggests that multinational corporations (MNCs) - locating in 
poor countries will replicate the technology used in the home country of the enterprise, 
disregarding the needs of the LDC in pursuit of its own profits. Underlying this argument 
is the assumption that the cost of modifying a technology exceeds the saving in 
production cost that can be realized by using more labor whose cost is lower in the LDC 
than in the home country. While plausible, the issue can be resolved only by an appeal to 
systematic evidence.  
Though individual anecdotes abound of highly automated plants being introduced 
by MNCS, several dozen studies using comparisons within countries of domestic and 
foreign firms producing the identical product largely support the hypothesis that no 
differences exist in the choice of plant and equipment. Where differences are present, it is 
the MNCs that typically show more adaptation of technology. One of the most careful 
studies produces the typical result in heightened fashion. Donald Lecraw compared three 
types of companies in Thailand: ones that are domestically owned; MNCs whose home 
country is another LDC, such as India or Hong Kong; and MNCs from the developed 
countries.
7 The highest capital per worker was exhibited by the domestic firms; the lowest 
by LDC-based multinationals. These and other results do not demonstrate the 
benevolence of MNCs nor the malevolence of domestic firms. Rather, they are 
manifestations of determinants of technology choice more basic than nationality of 
ownership - for example, the cost of obtaining appropriate equipment. Though more 
recent studies have not been carried out, it seems likely that foreign firms that are 
choosing LDC locations as export platforms to achieve lower costs are utilizing the most 
labor intensive equipment, consistent with cost minimization. 
                                                 
7  D. Lecraw, "Direct Investment by Firms from Less Developed Countries," 
Oxford Economic Papers, 23(9).442-57 (Nov. 1977). 
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IV.B.2. Cost of labor and capital and competitive markets 
 
The major determinants of the choice of technology are the cost of labor and 
equipment and the extent of competitive pressure. A company beginning or expanding its 
operations may adopt a variety of methods of production, the actual decision depending 
on the costs of the factors of production: labor, capital, and raw materials. It has become 
conventional to assert that labor costs are "too" high and capital costs too low in LDCS. 
What is the precise meaning of these statements? I briefly consider each of the two factor 
costs, wages and the cost of plant and equipment, in addition to competition. 
Hiring a worker entails the payment of a wage and one or more of the following: 
payments in kind - housing-fringe benefits, social security charges, and in some countries 
such supplements as "thirteenth month" salary. The cost of hiring a worker is "too" high 
if the value of the cash wage and other benefits exceeds the income the worker could 
command elsewhere, given his abilities, both inherited and obtained by education and on-
the-job experience. It has long been noted that the typical employee in a modern 
enterprise, be it a factory, bank office, or government agency, earns considerably more 
than a worker in small-scale artisan shops or in self- employment, such as barbering. 
Modern employment also provides incomes considerably in excess of that of agricultural 
workers and small-scale peasant farmers. It is generally believed that the observed 
income differentials do not represent a reward for greater productive ability, but are 
artificially high and institutionally supported, reflecting government minimum wage 
legislation, union bargaining success, and a guilty aversion to paying lower, more 
appropriate wages that characterize other activities. 
The statement that wages are too high thus refers to the norm of alternate income 
possibilities for a similarly skilled worker, either in the urban craft sector or in a variety 
of rural activities. It does not imply that these wages are excessive in comparison with 
those in developed countries or that such workers are able to afford a luxurious living 
standard. 
The cost of utilizing plant and equipment reflects the purchase price of a factory 
building or machine and the interests costs incurred in financing it. More precisely, the   14
cost of using plant or equipment is best viewed as the annual expenditure, namely, 
depreciation of the initial acquisition cost and a yearly financing charge incurred as a 
result of a decision to purchase the capital item. The purchase cost of equipment is too 
low in most LDCS, in the sense that the net effect of government foreign trade policies is 
typically to lower artificially the amount of domestic currency that must be given up to 
pay for an imported machine. For many industrial products this cheapening of foreign 
goods is offset by a relatively high, often prohibitive tariff imposed on imported goods 
that compete with domestically produced goods. However, no tariff is imposed on 
imported equipment in order to encourage domestic investment. Thus LDC firms 
purchasing new equipment pay a lower price than they would if governments did not 
discriminate among different types of imported goods. A low purchase price is reflected 
in low annual depreciation charges, one of the two major components of the annual cost 
of using equipment. 
As mentioned earlier, the second major cost is the financing charge. The interest 
rate paid by larger companies in the urban sector is too low as a result of governmentally 
imposed limitations on the rate of interest. At the existing low ceiling levels of rates, the 
total demand for funds exceeds the supply, and the existing supply is rationed among 
competing companies, none of whom is charged more than the legal maximum. 
Companies that are unsuccessful in this competition are forced to compete in a gray or 
black market in which the rates often are three or four times the official one. The 
successful, usually large, firms thus in effect receive subsidized loans. 
Apart from measures that lead to too low a purchase price and interest rate for 
many investors, numerous tax regulations further reduce the annual charge for using 
equipment. For example, investment credits and accelerated depreciation are likely to 
have adverse effects on the choice of production methods, particularly in view of the 
already high rates of return being earned by investors, who hardly require additional 
incentives.  The net effect of the existing set of distortions in wages and the cost of 
capital has biased the choice of individual firms toward production methods that use 
unnecessarily expensive machines rather than unskilled labor. 
The ratio of labor to capital costs is usually assumed to play a decisive role in   15
determining the relative amounts of capital and labor used in the production process. The 
importance of factor prices flows from the assumption of a competitive milieu. Factor 
prices play a more limited role, however, in noncompetitive environments. A firm 
currently realizing a 30 percent rate of return on equity capital, though using an 
inappropriately high ratio of capital to labor, may have little incentive to search for more 
appropriate methods that raise its return to 40 percent. The losses from forgone leisure 
and the difficulties often alleged to inhere in managing a larger labor force make such 
behavior plausible. If factor prices are to exert pressure toward adopting appropriate 
technology, competitive forces must be present. Given the small markets typical of many 
LDCS, such pressures are best engendered by international competition rather than by the 
proliferation of large numbers of small domestic companies, none of which is likely to 
reach economically efficient size. In the presence of high rates of tariff protection, 
changes in relative factor prices may have some beneficial effects, but these are likely to 
be highly attenuated. Thus an integral component of any determined effort to achieve 
more desirable factor proportions must be some increase in competitiveness in the 
product markets in which industrial firms participate. 
 
IV.B.3 Political economy of appropriate technology 
 
Even if factor prices do affect the decisions of enterprises, altering them to obtain 
the potential gains shown in Table 5 is likely to require considerable political astuteness. 
Such alteration involves revising the existing rules by which individuals earn 
income in a society. Union workers and those covered by effective minimum wage 
legislation would have to accept a decrease in their wages relative to the incomes of the 
marginal urban workers and the rural poor; firms receiving subsidized loans at an 8 
percent nominal annual rate of interest would have to pay 20 or 30 percent real (after 
inflation) rates of interest and would be subjected to increased competitive pressure as 
protective tariffs were reduced. Bureaucrats running the complex controls of much of the 
modern economy would lose their source of power, and, in some cases, substantial 
bribes. These changes would be required regardless of the form of ownership, private or   16
SOE. Although aggregate gains could be realized, each of the groups just enumerated 
will perceive itself as losing relative to other social groups and will not accept such losses 
without an intense political battle. In contrast, the probable beneficiaries are too 
numerous and the benefits too uncertain to induce the formation of effective advocacy 
groups. The potential gains from the reform constitute a classic example of a collective 
good from whose benefit it is difficult to exclude people, and hence no individual 
perceives it to be in his interest to share in the costs necessary to realize the goal. Small 
wonder that few countries have systematically chosen the price realignment route, and 
those few often only after a combination of external pressure from suppliers of foreign 
aid and internal stagnation. 
IV.B.4. Skills and investment 
 
I turn next to the question of whether the technical options that clearly do exist are 
quite as simple to implement as has been implicitly assumed previously. I will consider 
briefly two obstacles out of a half- dozen that may be important. These are, first, the 
possibility that less capital-intensive technologies, though employing more unskilled 
laborers, require a greater percentage of skilled labor and, second, that the information 
costs of learning about technological alternatives are substantial and thus a firm may find 
it more profitable to pursue other less expensive options to obtain increased profitability. 
It is sometimes suggested that appropriate equipment requires more skilled 
operatives, maintenance workers, and/or supervisory abilities. Since all of these skills are 
in short supply, it is concluded that more modern equipment that economizes on them  is 
desirable. The empirical basis for this view is rather tenuous, relying primarily on a few 
anecdotes. Assume, nevertheless, for the sake of argument that the view contains some 
substance. 
Should this be raised to high principle and the corollary deduced that production 
with less advanced technology is impossible? All too often precisely this leap is made, 
ignoring the possibility that even if greater skills are required, they may be acquired by 
private or public expenditure on the relevant training. The cost of this investment must 
then be compared with the benefits to be obtained from the appropriate technology.   17
While private firms may hesitate to make such a calculation, as workers they train may be 
pirated away by local firms, the refusal of LDC governments, public enterprises, and inter 
national agencies to pursue the benefit-cost calculus is shortsighted, as is the neglect of 
the usefulness of subsidies to encourage private firms to consider such training. 
Using the data gathered in the studies that form the basis of the calculations 
presented in Tables 4 and 5, the benefit-cost ratios have been calculated for two of the 
industries in which the skill requirements associated with the appropriate technology are 
in fact greater than those required by the advanced technology. The ratio of benefits to 
costs obtained from investing in training is considerably above 30, whereas a ratio of 1 
constitutes a justification for most projects. This result suggests that even where skill 
shortages are currently a factor limiting the adoption of labor-intensive technology, the 
desirable strategy for policymakers is to advocate a bundling of the requisite education 
and investment funds rather than passively accepting the adoption of unnecessarily 
advanced technology. 
 
IV.B.5. Cost of information 
 
I now turn to the cost of acquiring technical information, a question that typically 
has not been emphasized in this context but is clearly of considerable importance in 
understanding a number of observed phenomena. Usable information about production 
alternatives, including machine and product specifications, raw material and power 
requirements, and typical complements of labor of various skills, is generally not readily 
available despite the textbook simplifications all economists use to represent technical 
choices. The studies on which Tables 4 and 5 are based, as well as many other studies 
demonstrating the existence of a considerable variety of technical alternatives, required 
the cooperation of a group of economists and engineers for a year or more. It is likely to 
be quite expensive to ascertain the relevant technical options among which a firm may 
choose. 
It is easiest to obtain information about one or two technologies from   18
presentations by manufacturers of capital goods. However, in many LDCs salesmen 
arrive only from the largest producers in the technologically most advanced countries, 
such as Switzerland and Germany. Few representatives from smaller firms that may 
produce more appropriate equipment visit the typically sparse markets of sub-Saharan 
Africa or the poorest countries in other regions despite the likelihood that some of their 
equipment may be suitable. In general, it is time consuming and expensive to determine 
relevant technical alternatives - attendance at trade fairs, careful examination of large 
numbers of trade publications, and ascertaining the performance in operation, as 
contrasted with the specification of machine manufacturers all require large monetary 
outlays or a considerable expenditure of managerial time. 
While the hiring of consulting engineers might be thought desirable, they do not 
accept such assignments unless the total outlay on new plant and equipment is very large 
as their compensation is a percentage of the amount of equipment purchases. Plant 
managers themselves will be reluctant to allocate much of their own or staff time to the 
necessary search unless the prospective payoffs in terms of reduced costs are very large, 
since many alternative uses exist for their time, including improvement of current levels 
of efficiency, finding lower-cost suppliers of raw materials, and eliciting more favorable 
treatment from government agencies. 
The role of information permits an explanation of the good performance of MNCs 
with respect to technology. They can more cheaply identify relevant machinery and 
transfer it among subsidiaries, particularly equipment which is losing its competitive edge 
in countries with high and growing wages but which would be appropriate in low- wage 
countries. The parent company may even have established a new plant partly to utilize 
such equipment in the production of exports from a low-wage country. Alternatively, the 
local MNC manager may request that the purchasing office of the parent company 
perform the search for desirable equipment. Lowered cost to the local subsidiary increase 
the probability of the subsidiary's purchasing appropriate machinery that will allow it to 
take advantage of the relatively low price of labor in the LDC. 
The listing of equipment on business-to-business web sites might be thought of as 
one solution to the lack of information in developing countries. However, a simple listing   19
of equipment on a manufacturer’s web site is likely to be inadequate. Equipping an entire 
factory requires, in general, the meshing of many types of machinery, produced by a 
variety of firms. There are a huge number of permutations of machinery but the 
feasibility of actually operating many types of equipment from various manufacturers in 
settings in which some of the environmental parameters, for example, low quality raw 
materials, high humidity, and more dust, differ considerably from the country of origin, 
require coordination that is not available from the web sites of capital goods producers. 
The difficulties of optimizing equipment combinations that must be utilized sequentially 
solely through business-to-business websites may be likened to the difficulties of 
determining from a website whether two drugs are contra-indicated. Very low probability 
drug interactions are duly recorded to reduce the drug maker’s liability yet a physician 
weighing the benefits from taking the two drugs and the low probability of the interaction 
will advise a patient to ignore the warning. In the case of obtaining equipment that can 
interact correctly in an LDC setting, the equivalent of a physician is necessary.  
Websites can provide a menu but the choice ultimately requires considerable 
skills on the part of the firm making the choices. Private sector firms that have 
engineering competence and have faced international competition have been much better 
at making such difficult choices than state owned enterprises or private firms that have 
been protected. 
V. Improving Total Factor Productivity 
One mode of obtaining increased GDP from a given investment level is an 
improved choice of sectors and technologies, allocative efficiency. The other is through 
improved productive efficiency or TFP.  
Two types of studies have analyzed the sources of low levels of productivity 
levels in SSA. The first measures the performance of firms in SSA relative to best 
practice firms in the OECD countries and analyzes the source of the shortfall. For 
example, Pack, 1987, analyzes the source of lower relative TFP in textile firms in Kenya 
relative to plants in the U.K. using identical equipment. Some of the lower productivity is 
attributable to low product specialization, a reflection of the import substitution strategy, 
some to inadequate management knowledge of production engineering. Relatively little   20
of the productivity shortfall is due to deficient labor skills. The firms investigated were 
large MNCs and thus it is perhaps not surprising that their performance was relatively 
good. Contrary to widespread views, in well managed firms African workers exhibit the 
same level of productivity as English workers after allowing for differences in 
equipment-labor ratios, the effects of short production runs, and management 
deficiencies. 
A second approach analyzing large number of firms allows the calculation of TFP 
for all firms relative to the U.S. These results that were reported in Table 3 indicate very 
low TFP is typical of African manufacturing. The obvious question is why these dramatic 
differences occur. The determinants of productivity of individual firms can be 
proximately divided into those arising at the economy-wide level, the industry in which 
the firm is a member, and the firm itself.  
V.A  The National Economy and Technology System 
V.A.1 The National Economic Policy Framework 
It is a staple of the development literature that national economic policy can affect 
the productivity levels of firms. A policy of import substituting industrialization leads to 
limited competition and weakens incentives to seek methods to improve efficiency. 
Opportunities presented by ISI or distorted exchange rates provide opportunities for rent 
seeking that are larger than those to be realized from improving efficiency. The low 
profitability of exports may discourage firms from entering foreign markets and they do 
not obtain the spur to innovation and cost reduction arising from the need to reduce costs 
and increase quality. Finally, a domestically oriented strategy may reduce the availability 
of foreign exchange, leading to limits on the ability of firms to import machinery and 
intermediates. The countries of SSA have large export sectors, almost entirely resource 
based, but the real value of these exports has stagnated or declined in most countries. 
Nevertheless there is a need for imported inputs given the low levels of production of 
intermediate and capital manufactured goods with SSA. Hence, the failure of exports to 
grow limits the ability of manufacturing to expand. In the last decades, the decline in real 
export earnings may have reduced capacity utilization and led to a lower level of TFP 
through the reduction of the variety of inputs.    21
Apart from the incentive regime, the functioning of the national economy can 
affect the productivity of firms more directly, for example, an erratic electricity supply 
can reduce TFP measured on an annual basis by leading to interruptions in production. If 
firms respond to this by building their own generators, they will incur capital costs that 
are greater than competitors in other countries, further increasing their unit capital input. 
Lee and Anas (1990) have shown that such costs have been considerable in Nigerian 
manufacturing.  
V.A.2. The National Technology System 
The evidence of this paper suggests that the manufacturing sector in SSA is 
considerably below the world best practice frontier. If income levels are to be raised, this 
gap must be reduced. Most of the discussion of poor African performance concentrates 
on policy variables, largely because one looks for a lost key under the lamppost 
regardless of where it was lost. Price denominated policy changes such as import 
liberalization may generate a need for firms to respond to a newly competitive 
atmosphere. But in the absence of a supply of such inputs and of the firms’ understanding 
of their own needs and the ability to productively absorb these new inputs, there is likely 
to be a limited increase in long term TFP rather than a short term increase in capacity 
utilization. A critical issue in Africa is the generation of the appropriate institutional 
structure to support industrialization.  
Some of the requisites are clear – more trained engineers and technical school 
graduates are important. Mlawa (1983) reported that the eight major Tanzanian textile 
mills employed six trained textile engineers. Comparable plants in Kenya, run by MNCs, 
each had six to ten. Given that the high explicit and opportunity costs of training, the 
appropriate mix of skills, domestic versus foreign training, and so on require careful 
thought. But assuming that their will be automatic response of enrolments as a shortage 
of textile engineers appears is to place too much faith in the speed of response.  
Changes in the domestic education structure are necessarily intermediate to long 
term issues. In the shorter run, firms facing the need to upgrade their technical 
capabilities have a number of options. Among the more effective short term solutions is 
the hiring of foreign consultants employed by the firms. Here there may be a role for   22
international agencies as screening agents as this is a very imperfect market. There is also 
a risk of aid agency failure as many of the consultants hired directly by these agencies 
appear to have obtained the contracts without regard to demonstrated ability. Individual 
countries can also facilitate the use of consultants by expediting the approval process. 
Often governments have engaged in a form of import substitution in this area, requiring 
proof from the firm that no existing nationals are adequate substitutes and adding on to 
this onerous tax provisions.  
A characteristic of all African countries is an exceptionally low level of 
technology licensing. This stands in marked contrast to the experience in many of the 
Asian countries in which governments encouraged licensing as a cost-effective method of 
improving productivity. Though questions have arisen about the “fairness” of the terms 
of licensing agreements,
8 it is nevertheless quite clear that even if LDC firms pay costs 
greater than marginal costs of delivery, the cost of improving existing practice by a given 
percentage through licensing is less than if firms had to achieve these improvements 
through their own R & D. Here, too, there may be a role for government in reviewing 
technology agreements and helping firms to obtain better terms. But experience in other 
countries suggests this is likely to be expensive in terms of the opportunity cost of the 
reviewers. 
Apart from transfers of foreign knowledge, the experience of the Asian countries 
suggests that domestic technological institutions may be important. KIST in Korea, ITRI 
and the China Productivity Center in Taiwan, China and others institutions were able to 
respond to the production problems of firms and also helped to generate a corps of 
trained professionals who then became important in diffusing knowledge among firms. 
While no econometric evidence exists on the role of these institutions, anecdotal evidence 
abounds
9. Such institutions are all the more important in light of the geographic 
“thinness” of African manufacturing and the smaller likelihood that normal labor 
mobility and interchange of ideas will diffuse technology. As in other areas of potential 
                                                 
8 In particular, whether licensees should be expected to pay part of the initial R & D cost 
of the technology or simply the marginal cost of transmission. 
9 See Dahlman and Sanikone, 1997.   23
government policy, this strategy has a risk unless the demand exists to utilize such 
services. India has three exceptionally capable textile research institutes sponsored by 
contributions of firms in each of three textile producing regions. Nevertheless, during the 
period in which the sector was protected from external competition and domestic 
competition was limited by investment licensing, the sector did not achieve any 
significant productivity growth and its level of TFP was quite low. 
 
V.B. Industry Level Impacts 
 
Most SSA countries have a very small manufacturing sector. There are limited 
possibilities for intra and inter industry interaction. For example, in Kenya there are five 
integrated textile factories, several located hundreds of miles from the closest textile 
plant. The potential gains flowing from interfirm interactions within the same sector, such 
as informal discussion of production engineering problems encountered by managers, 
joint training, or the availability of a pool of workers with experience within the sector 
doesn’t exist.
10 Similarly, inter-industry interaction is largely absent. For example, in 
many countries, a set of local, specialized firms that take advantages of economies of 
scope to service the larger firms, is absent.  
The sparseness of industrial development is quite clear – the relatively low levels 
of manufacturing in national output are accompanied by small number of large firms 
present in each sector. Table 6 shows the number of firms in each two digit sector for 
Colombia and Tanzania, (countries with similar populations) the countries being 
determined by the availability of internationally comparable sources. The number of 
firms in Tanzania is very small, less than 5% of that in Colombia in most sectors. 
Moreover, these sectors are broadly defined and include many subsectors -  there may be 
only one firm producing a given product - an environment not conducive to horizontal 
interfirm learning through the exchange of knowledge. Moreover, insofar as smaller 
                                                 
10 For a contrast see Saxenian’s (1995) description of the extensive interaction among 
firms in Silicon Valley.   24
firms are often suppliers of specialized intermediates to the larger firms (as well as 
manufacturing final products), the data imply that the advantages of specialized input 
suppliers is largely lost, firms producing a large range of products, many requiring 
specialized equipment used for only a fraction of each day. 
Table 7, adapted from Biggs, et. al. (1995), documents this phenomenon for 
Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, the data being derived from firm level information. The 
vast majority of firms in the sample do not subcontract locally and those that obtain 50 
percent or more of their inputs through subcontracting is 2 to 3 percent. Economies of 
scale and scope are both lost in addition to any externalities. This absence of 
subcontracting is not, of course, solely an African phenomenon but holds in many LDCs. 
Explanations have ranged from the absence of trust to the costliness of establishing 
subcontracting. Yet such interactions have been important to development in many of the 
Asian countries such as Taiwan, China, and Japan. 
 
V.C Firm Specific Determinants of Productivity 
 
As just noted, the characteristics of the national economy and the structure of the 
industry of which the firm is a part will affect its productivity. But many of the major 
determinants of TFP occur at the firm level. It is convenient for expositional purposes to 
consider two groups of firms, those on the domestic best practice frontier and those not 
achieving it.  The wide dispersion of TFP about best practice in SSA, greater than that in 
other regions, raises the question of the sources of such dispersion. Thus I will analyze 
why productivity is so low even among the best local firms  and then consider why even 
this low level has diffused so little among the first in a country.  
V.C.1 Best Practice Firms - Static Issues 
In principle, firms can buy knowledge and the same physical inputs and achieve 
similar TFP.  While economists are fond of the abstract concept of a production function, 
there are no encyclopedia entries or websites describing how to obtain maximum output 
from a given collection of inputs. University trained engineers will have studied many of   25
the elements of a technology but will not have learned to deal with all the permutations 
that arise in actual production situations in a developing countries where unexpected 
problems may arise from the need to use materials with properties not envisioned by the 
machine producers, polluted water, erratic energy, and different climatic conditions. 
Some of the knowledge required to deal with these may be incorporated in machinery or 
in systems that transport material among  work stations. Some of the requisite knowledge 
is codified and is transmitted by the sellers of equipment (the temperature or humidity in 
a weaving shed required to reduce defective cloth).  
Some of the observed productivity shortfalls reflect responses of firms to 
incorrect policy. For example, the characteristic relatively short production runs may 
reflect an optimal response of firms selling in the more profitable domestic market rather 
than taking advantage of the economies of specialization and producing for export. But 
some of the knowledge that is necessary to increase output per bundle of inputs is not-
codified or is tacit. It is not written down in any usable form, typically requires 
production experience to alter it to local conditions, and is embodied in individuals. 
Many firms in SSA lie below international best practice partly because of the absence of 
such knowledge. 
Detailed studies of SSA firms find they have imported much of their machinery. 
If such equipment were utilized at its potential, the productivity differences of the 
magnitude that currently prevail would not exist. Some knowledge is missing. Best 
practice firms appear to be quite inefficient relative to those in the industrialized 
countries, even when using similar equipment. This reflects the absence of the “software” 
rather than that of hardware. The low TFP level of best practice firms may partly reflect 
optimal responses to the policy environment but micro evidence also suggests deficient 
technological effort and knowledge. A key issue is whether this reflects rational firm 
response to the absence of competitive pressure or whether the firms are simply too 
isolated to know they could improve their condition and earn greater profits given the 
levels of protection.  
There are a number of channels that firms could employ to improve their 
productivity, for example, the hiring of foreign firms or individuals as consultants, the   26
use of technology licensing agreements, and efforts by the firms’ own staff to learn about 
the technology. The evidence from intensive samples suggests that even best practice 
firms do not engage in such practices with the intensity that is typical of firms in 
countries that have succeeded in industrial development. For example, only nine of 214 
firms surveyed by Biggs et. al. have signed technology licensing agreements and only 17 
have signed technology assistance agreements with foreign firms. 
Nevertheless, in explaining differences from best practice, technology variables 
such as technology licensing do not have large coefficients. Analyzing short run cost 
functions for all firms Pack and Paxson (2000), using Biggs’sample, find most 
technology variables are not significant - variations in value added are accounted for 
largely by differences in labor input – measures of technological variables such as foreign 
licenses  and advanced education are not generally significant. This is at variance with 
the experience of Asian NICs where case studies and some econometric work show that 
the acquisition of foreign technology and domestic education have been important 
components of the growth process. This discrepancy in patterns may be explained by the 
absence of a competitive environment in most of SSA – while the presence of technology 
provides the necessary condition for improved productivity, if there are limited 
competitive pressures, there will be no pressure to employ these successfully. 
V.C.2 Non-best practice firms 
There is more variation in TFP among firms in SSA industries than in other 
regions. Even the limited knowledge of the best practice firms is not diffused as widely as 
in other regions. Partly this may again represent a rational response to a lack of incentives 
– there is no need to hire away some knowledgeable workers from a more efficient firm 
in the absence of competitive pressure. And, there are no incentives, especially in view of 
the relatively small size of firms and the considerable fixed costs involved, of attempting 
to enter licensing agreements or hire consultants. 
But part of the high variation of TFP may precisely reflect the low density of SSA 
manufacturing. Much of the diffusion of knowledge in “dense” industrial sectors 
presumably arises from the interchange of personnel in whom tacit knowledge is 
embodied. Such flows cannot result when factories are very far from each other and firms   27
tend to be self contained.   
The basic problem in African manufacturing is not the absence of either capital or 
complementary inputs but the low productivity realized with them. While output could 
nevertheless be made competitive with other countries if either low  wages/and or the 
correct exchange rate are present, the absence of improvement in currently  low TFP 
levels implies  a low real wage for workers and their dependents even if output grows 
through exports or domestic sales.  
Can low TFP levels be improved? The policy variables suggested by cross- 
country regressions to explain bad African performance are not incorrect but they miss an 
important issue. A contraction of parallel market premia would result from better 
exchange rate management combined with import liberalization. Such changes may 
generate a perception of the need to respond to greater competitiveness and thus lead to a 
demand for inputs that would permit the desired response. But in most SSA countries 
there is no set of supply side institutions that can help firms. There is no evidence that 
liberalization policies have in fact succeeded in raising TFP for more than a year or two, 
largely as a result of increased capacity utilization as the foreign exchange constraint is 
softened (World Bank, 1994).  
It could be argued that in light of this, industrialization is premature. Only when 
the supply of inputs is there and firms are capable of recognizing the need for them and 
absorbing them will industrialization be appropriate. Yet given the constraints imposed 
by the difficulty of improving agricultural productivity, some effort to foster 
industrialization may be desirable. The institutional requirements are significant and the 
dangers of intervention must be recognized. But there is also some hope given the 
experience in Asia, albeit with more favorable initial conditions. It is also useful to note 
the low TFP levels in Korea in the late 1960s to avoid undue pessimism (Pilat, 1994). In 
manufacturing more than in other sectors, international technology transfer may be 
feasible. The country fixed effects of soil, sun, and rainfall are absent.       
Finally, in most SSA countries it is likely that the industrial sector is currently too 
thin to generate productivity augmenting interactions among firms. The difficulty is that   28
such lacunae are not easily corrected by public policy. While an attempt to encourage 
firms with backward and forward linkages could be attempted, in most countries this has 
simply led to inefficiency in the protected supplying or purchasing sectors. For example, 
in Tanzania, the creation of upstream sectors such as pulp and paper plants and textile 
mills yielded few downstream benefits, either in their vicinity or in the rest of the 
country. Clusters that arise in response to market signals are clearly preferable.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
These results suggest several principles for the improvement of African 
productivity and by extension to that in other very poor economies. First, production can 
at first be directed to goods that are in high local demand. The initial high prices implied 
by low productivity, assuming the latter is not offset by comparable low wages, implies 
an initial domestic orientation. The goods in question can be produced by local firms with 
some minor technical help from abroad. The lack of FDI, understandable given the 
absence of fundamentals noted above, is not critical at this stage in African 
manufacturing.
11  But there is a circularity that is important to emphasize, namely, the 
domestic demand for African manufactured products will partly be dependent on growing 
income in the agricultural sector. Absent such growth, manufacturing will play a small 
role unless local firms can enter export markets but this is contingent on improving 
productivity, quality control, and marketing skills that would imply the need for 
international links. There seem to be few prospects of this at the present time and thus 
any growth in manufacturing will necessarily be aimed at the domestic market, assuming 
that incomes are growing. 
                                                 
11 Although it is not surprising that Africa has received very low levels of FDI, improving 
the fundamentals would attract some investment. Such investment has been critical to 
improving the industrial sector in a recently poor country such as China.    29
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GNP per capita – current dollars 
 


















        
Sub-saharan Africa  420  490  -  - 
Indonesia 230  980  1.83  .50 
South Korea  640  9,700  .66  .05 
Malaysia 890  3,890  .47  .13 
Thailand 310  2,740  1.08  .18 
China        
India        
        
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, cd rom. 
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Table 2 






















106 48.9  58  41
a  
        
Indonesia   120  53  62  22 
South Korea   37  63  93  74 
Malaysia   32  68  60  48 
Thailand 68  62  84  28 
China 56  64  66  51 
        
Note: a – 1997; 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report, 1981, United Nations 
Development Program, Human Development Report, 2000.   33
 
Table 3 
Production Characteristics of African Manufacturing, early 1990s 






Furniture Metal  Work 
 
    
  1992 1994 1992 1994 1992 1994 1992 1994 
Cameroon  0.21   0.22   0.64   .65   0.72   0.43   0.57   0.75  
Ghana  0.03   0.01   0.02   0.02  0.03   0.03   0.03   0.02   
Kenya  0.07   0.11   0.08   0.15  0.06   0.06   0.10   0.10   
Tanzania  0.03   0.02   0.09   0.08   0.04   0.08   0.07   0.08  
Zambia  0.06   0.07   0.10   0.08   0.11   0.05   0.13   0.10  
Zimbabwe  0.08   0.08   0.11   0.09   0.13   0.09   0.19   0.11  
 
  Capital Stock per Worker Relative to U.S.  
          
Cameroon  0.33   0.25   1.13   1.00   0.47   0.29   0.26   0.37  
Ghana  0.10   0.03   0.08   0.15  0.05   0.04   0.04   0.05   
Kenya  0.16   0.18   0.24   0.35  0.07   0.06   0.13   0.07   
Tanzania  0.11   0.10   0.37   0.40   0.12   0.08   0.05   0.08  
Zambia  0.08   0.26   0.47   0.38   .09   0.17   0.12    0.07  
Zimbabwe  0.14   0.09   0.29   0.11   0.11   0.06   0.17   0.05  
          
  Total Factor Productivity Relative to U.S. 
          
Cameroon  0.33 0.38 0.61 0.65 0.97 0.71 0.98 1.11 
Ghana  0.07 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 
Kenya  0.15 0.21 0.14 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.30 
Tanzania 0.07 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.21 
Zambia  0.16 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.28 
Zimbabwe  0.17 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.31 0.27 0.38 0.36 
Sources: Author’s calculation from Biggs et. al. 1995, U.S. Census of Manufacturing, 
1992, and Jacob et. al., 1997.   34
Table 4 









  (thousands of dollars)   
      
Shoes 2.2  .8  .36 
Cotton Weaving  37.6  8.7  .23 
Cotton Spinning  14.7  2.0  .14 
Brickmaking 45.8  3.3  .07 
Maize Milling  9.7  2.9  .30 
Sugar processing  6.2  .8  .13 
Beer Brewing  18.3  12.1  .66 
Leather processing  36.2  15.5  .43 
Fertilizer 137.6  122.3  .89 
 
    Source: Calculated from Pack, 1982. 
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Table 5 











  Millions of dollars per year   
       
Appropriate 624  119  505  238.7 
        
Advanced 364  29  335  58.0 
    
 Source: Calculated from Pack, 1982. 
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Table 6 
Number of Firms in Colombia, Tanzania 
 
Sector  Number of Firms 
  Colombia - 1985  Tanzania – 1985 
Food Processing  1096  138 
Beverages 124  15 
Tobacco 14  3 
Textiles 443  77 
Wearing Apparel  979  56 
Leather Products  324  15 
Wood Products  166  60 
Furniture, Fixtures  164  15 
Paper and Products   135  8 
Pulp and Paper  27  3 
Printing, Publishing  342  44 
Industrial Chemicals  114  10 
Basic, excl. fert.   71  5 
Other Chemicals  280  35   37
Rubber Products  73  8 
Plastic Products  291  5 
Non-metallic mineral  366  14 
Basic Metals  83  6 
Metal Products  506  43 
Machinery   300  13 
Electrical Machinery  180  10 
Transport Equipment  207  20 
 





Firms by Size of 
Employment 
No subcontracting  >50 
<10 81  2 
10-49 72  2 
50-99 88  6 
>100 91  0 
Sector    
Food 90  3 
Textiles and Garments  93  0 
Wood Working  68  3 
Metal Working  76  2 
 
Source: Biggs, Shah, Srivastava, 1995, Table 7.13. 
 
 
 
 
 